FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-23:03.openssl
16 February, 2023 by security-advisories@freebsd.org | freebsd
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FreeBSD-SA-23:03.openssl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
Category: contrib
Module: openssl
Announced: 2023-02-16
Credits: See referenced OpenSSL advisory.
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2023-02-07 22:38:40 UTC (stable/13, 13.1-STABLE)
2023-02-16 17:58:13 UTC (releng/13.1, 13.1-RELEASE-p7)
2023-02-07 23:09:41 UTC (stable/12, 12.4-STABLE)
2023-02-16 18:04:12 UTC (releng/12.4, 12.4-RELEASE-p2)
2023-02-16 18:03:37 UTC (releng/12.3, 12.3-RELEASE-p12)
CVE Name: CVE-2023-0286, CVE-2023-0215, CVE-2022-4450, CVE-2022-4304
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is a
collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
Open Source toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. It is
also a general-purpose cryptography library.
II. Problem Description
* X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286)
There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING but
the public structure definition for GENERAL_NAME incorrectly specified the type
of the x400Address field as ASN1_TYPE. This field is subsequently interpreted by
the OpenSSL function GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE rather than an
ASN1_STRING.
* Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption (CVE-2022-4304)
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation.
* Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215)
The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for streaming
ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL to support
the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also be called
directly by end user applications.
The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1 filter
BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns the new head
of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions, for example if a
CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO is freed and the
function returns a NULL result indicating a failure. However, in this case,
the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the BIO passed by the caller
still retains internal pointers to the previously freed filter BIO.
* Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex (CVE-2022-4450)
The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data. In
this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate the
header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
III. Impact
* X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286)
When CRL checking is enabled (i.e. the application sets the
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK flag), this vulnerability may allow an attacker to pass
arbitrary pointers to a memcmp call, enabling them to read memory contents or
enact a denial of service. In most cases, the attack requires the attacker to
provide both the certificate chain and CRL, neither of which need to have a
valid signature. If the attacker only controls one of these inputs, the other
input must already contain an X.400 address as a CRL distribution point, which
is uncommon. As such, this vulnerability is most likely to only affect
applications which have implemented their own functionality for retrieving CRLs
over a network.
* Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption (CVE-2022-4304)
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation
which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a
Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker
would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for
decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,
RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
* Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215)
A use-after-free will occur under certain conditions. This will most likely
result in a crash.
* Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex (CVE-2022-4450)
A double free may occur. This will most likely lead to a crash. This could be
exploited by an attacker who has the ability to supply malicious PEM files
for parsing to achieve a denial of service attack.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64, i386, or
(on FreeBSD 13 and later) arm64 platforms can be updated via the
freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-23:03/openssl.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-23:03/openssl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system.
VI. Correction details
This issue is corrected by the corresponding Git commit hash or Subversion
revision number in the following stable and release branches:
Branch/path Hash Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/13/ 0904c29a0a11 stable/13-n254398
releng/13.1/ e237b128e080 releng/13.1-n250181
stable/12/ r372906
releng/12.4/ r372939
releng/12.3/ r372936
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
For FreeBSD 13 and later:
Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
particular commit:
# git show --stat <commit hash>
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:
<URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>
To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
nNNNNNN in the table above), run:
# git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD
For FreeBSD 12 and earlier:
Run the following command to see which files were modified by a particular
revision, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20230207.txt>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-0286>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-0215>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-4450>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-4304>
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-23:03.openssl.asc>
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